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Abstract:  
The role of norms and military utility in the use of weapons is disputed by constructivist and 
realist scholars. Through an examination of US decision-making regarding anti-plant and 
irritant agents in the Vietnam War, I advance this debate in three key ways: First, I develop 
structural realism’s expectations regarding the role of military utility. Second, I demonstrate 
that social and material factors are at play in our understandings of both ‘norms’ and ‘military 
utility’, and that both played a role in US decisions. Third, I find that the dominant role—as 
structural realism expects—was played by military utility. 
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Realist and constructivist scholars have long disputed the role of norms and military 
utility in the use and non-use of weapons. Here I revisit the debate and examine the 
influence of norms and utility on US decisions regarding the use of anti-plant and irritant 
agents in the Vietnam War. I find that while norms concerning chemical weapons, legality, 
and discrimination in war all played a role in US policy, the overriding factor in US decision-
making was military effectiveness and in particular the usefulness of these agents in 
accomplishing US goals in Vietnam. This finding corresponds to the expectations of 
structural realism.1  
According to realists, the anarchic nature of the international system encourages 
states to prioritise survival and security, particularly in times of war; thus the use or non-use 
of a weapon should be strongly influenced by considerations of military utility. In contrast, 
constructivist scholars such as Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald argue that state policy 
makers are also constrained by norms, and that in particular, the norms surrounding 
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons play an important role in making these weapons 
unusable.2 The contribution that Tannenwald, Price and others have made is to show that 
norms exist and matter even in the ‘hard security’ realm that has been the ‘home turf’ of 
realist theories.3  
While the importance of both norms and military utility in international politics is now 
clear, there is still work to do on how they matter—what role these factors play. In addition, 
the work on norms and weapons has highlighted the fact that there is no fully developed 
realist account of what determines the role of particular weapons in international politics. 
Realists have assumed, rather than demonstrated, that military utility and consequentialist 
reasoning dominate decisions regarding the use of weapons. This article addresses these 
gaps.  
 In addition, my analysis of the role of norms and military utility supports the work of 
other scholars who argue that the international system constrains states to base decisions 
on expected consequences as opposed to norms.4 For example, Stephen Krasner argues 
                                            
1 Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (NY: Random House, 1979).  
2 Richard M Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997); Richard Price, 
‘Reversing the Gun Sights: ‘Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines’, International 
Organization 52/3 (1998), 613-44; Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the 
Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007). 
3 See also Matthew Evangelista and Henry Shue, eds., The American Way of Bombing (Ithaca: 
Cornell UP, 2014); Peter J Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (NY: Columbia UP, 
1996); Jeffrey W Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca: 
Cornell UP, 1995); TV Paul,  The Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
UP, 2009). 
4 Stephen D Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999); see also 
Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth and Sarah Croco, ‘Covenants without the Sword: International Law 
and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War’, World Politics, 58/3 (April 2006), 339-377; Alexander 
B Downes, Targeting Civilians in War (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2008). 
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that ‘stronger states can pick and choose among different rules selecting the one that best 
suits their instrumental objectives’, and American policy makers did just that in this case, 
justifying the use of irritant agents in Vietnam by arguing that they were more humane when 
civilians were intermixed with combatants.5  
 Because both norms and military utility were important, one can tell the story of the 
use and non-use of CBN in Vietnam in at least two ways. The first highlights the importance 
of norms: Throughout the Vietnam War, the US recognised the use of lethal chemical and 
biological agents as wrong. Although it had not signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which 
banned the first use of chemical and biological weapons, American policymakers did not 
base the legality of American use of anti-plant and irritant agents in Vietnam on its non-
signatory status.  Instead, it claimed that its use of anti-plant and irritant agents fell outside 
the Geneva Protocol, which it recognised as part of customary international law.  Thus, US 
decision makers argued that the US abided by the norms governing CB weapons, and in 
retrospect, we can see that debates over the US position contributed to a strengthening of 
the norm against CBW use. Similarly, Tannenwald argues that the US recognised an 
emerging taboo on nuclear use during the Vietnam War and that its decision not to use 
nuclear weapons contributed to the further development of that taboo.6  
The second version emphasizes the role of military utility and the consequentialist 
logic that drove US decisions about use. US decision makers evaluated the consequences 
of use, weighing military utility against political costs. They concluded that anti-plant and 
irritant agents had utility that outweighed the political costs, and used them accordingly. In 
contrast, they did not use biological, lethal chemical, and nuclear weapons, because they 
lacked military utility within the strategic context of Vietnam. 
I argue that both versions are correct. Both norms and military utility were active 
factors in US decision-making. Ultimately, however, the evidence suggests that a 
consequentialist logic and concerns about military utility were determinative in decisions 
regarding use; the central focus of decision-making was on the extent to which the use of 
these weapons would aid or impede the attainment of US goals. Policy-makers treated 
normative concerns as political costs and factored them into consequentialist reasoning. 
However, it is also clear that norms played an independent role in the decision-making 
process. For example, decision makers did see CBN weapons as ‘different’ from ordinary 
weapons and argued that decisions about their use required at least some top decision 
maker consideration.   
                                            
5 Krasner, Sovereignty, 6. 
6 Nina Tannenwald, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Vietnam War’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 29/4 
(August 2006), 675-722; see also Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo. 
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 This case also demonstrates that social and material factors are at play in both 
‘norms’ and ‘military effectiveness’. For example, as I show below, people both within and 
without the Kennedy Administration reached different judgements about the military utility of 
anti-plant agents. This continued even when there was data from the actual use of these 
agents in Vietnam. However, this did not have much impact on policy. US policy makers 
largely treated technology as a given and military (in)effectiveness as inherent in that 
technology (or at least in given applications of that technology). In addition, the evidence 
here suggests that once approval has been given for the use of a weapon, it is difficult  to 
halt that use, at least within the context of an on-going conflict where there is pressure to use 
any tool available to accomplish one’s goals. This emphasis on the possible military 
contribution made by a weapon, as opposed to its other attributes, accords with realism’s 
expectations. 
The Vietnam War is an appropriate case study because the US had chemical and 
biological agents as well as nuclear weapons available for use. While details of the US CBN 
arsenal are difficult to obtain, the existence of US strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is 
well known.7 In terms of chemical weapons, the Centre for Disease Control reports that by 
1968 the US had stockpiled close to 40,000 tons of chemical warfare agents.8 In terms of 
biological weapons, David Franz reports that by 1951 the US was producing an anticrop 
biological weapon and that by the mid-1950s it was producing various agents for 
antipersonnel biological cluster bombs.9 
Critics might suggest that this is an ‘easy’ case for realism because it concerns 
decision-making during war and because the US used both anti-plant and irritant weapons.10 
However, the case provides an important window into decision-making on the use of 
particular weapons: The use of each type of agent evolves in a different way, providing two 
different ways that use comes about. In addition, the decision to use of anti-plant agents was 
                                            
7 See William Burr, ed., ‘How Many and Where Were the Nukes?: What the US Government No 
Longer Wants You to Know about Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War’, National Security Archive 
Electronic Briefing Book No. 197, posted 18 August 2006, available at : 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB197/ (accessed 8 October 2015).  
8 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, ‘History of US Weapons Elimination’, available at: 
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/demil/history.htm downloaded 11 March 2015. 
9 David R Franz, Cheryl D Parrott, and Ernest T Takafuju, ‘The US Biological Warfare and Biological 
Defense Programs’ in Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare eds. Frederick R Sidell, 
Ernest T Takafuju and David R Franz (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General at TMM 
Publications, Borden Institute, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 1997), available at: 
http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/borden/Portlet.aspx?ID=bddf382f-3ca0-44ba-bd67-fdc48bfa03de. 
However, it is also true that the US military had not fully assimilated biological weapons and that 
American preparedness for biological warfare was judged unsatisfactory. See John Ellis van 
Courtland Moon, ‘The US Biological Weapons Program’ in Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons 
Since 1945 eds. Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rozsa and Malcom Dando (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2006), 9-
46. 
10 Note that the larger project of which this work is a part also examines the non-use of nuclear, 
biological and lethal chemical weapons during the Vietnam War. 
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controversial, and there were intense discussions about whether such use made sense. 
Given the extent to which some of the constructivist accounts have discounted military utility, 
it is important to make the realist case. The extensive debates about the use of anti-plant 
agents provide an opportunity to do so. 
The arguments that follow depend largely on an examination of US government 
decision-making through the available documentary record. I also examine media accounts, 
including New York Times coverage, memoirs of various office holders, and secondary 
sources. The reliance on government documents could be problematic, because policy 
briefs and government memorandum are likely to use the language of military strategy and 
consequentialist reasoning, regardless of the ‘true’ motivation behind a policy.  However, an 
example from the Eisenhower Administration shows that there is room to make 
appropriateness arguments within government circles: The 1958 Basic National Security 
Policy declared the use of preventive war to reduce Soviet or Chinese communist military 
power to be ‘unacceptable’ to the United States and its allies, and ruled it out of bounds on 
those grounds.11  
The argument has three steps. First, I draw on March and Olson’s distinction between 
consequentialist and appropriateness reasoning to investigate the logic of decisions 
revealed in the documentary record.12 I find that the logic of anticipated consequences 
dominates the logic of appropriateness; norms entered into consequentialist arguments by 
creating political costs, but decision makers consistently argued that if a weapon had military 
utility it should be used. Second, I develop structural-realist expectations regarding systemic 
constraints on the use of weapons, and I analyse the role played by three types of military 
utility—technical, tactical, and strategic—in decisions on the use of anti-plant and irritant 
agents. Third, I examine the role of normative factors, including the ‘taboo’ nature of 
chemical weapons, legal restrictions, and the broader laws of war. In the conclusion, I 
summarise the main arguments and identify avenues for further research. Before turning to 
the main arguments, I situate the Vietnam War within broader American policy and 
summarise US decisions regarding anti-plant and irritant agents to provide context for the 
analysis that follows. 
 
The Vietnam War 
                                            
11 Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1958-1960, Vol. III, National Security Policy; Arms 
Control and Disarmament, eds. Edward C Keefer and David W Mabon (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1996), Doc. 24, ‘Statement of Basic National Security Policy’, National Security 
Council Report, 5 May 1958. In retrospect, it is also striking how easily American policy-makers 
brushed this norm aside in the 2003 War in Iraq.  
12 James P March and Johan P Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’, 
International Organization 52/4 (September 1998), 949-954. 
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In order to understand US decisions regarding the use of anti-plant and irritant 
weapons in the Vietnam War, it is necessary to understand four characteristics of the war. 
First, the United States was not directly threatened by North Vietnam or by the extension of 
the North Vietnamese regime to South Vietnam. There was no prospect of an attack on the 
United States, no vital interests such as raw materials or sea lanes to which the US would 
lose access. The threat in Vietnam was indirect. The Vietnam War was important for the 
United States only to the extent that it was part of the on-going struggle with the USSR, as 
part of the Cold War and the conflict between Capitalism and Communism. Yet in the 1960s, 
this made Vietnam very important indeed. American decision makers generally believed that 
what was at stake for the US was the credibility of its commitment to defend non-Communist 
states, and they worried that the loss of South Vietnam would be one in a series of dominoes 
leading to Communist control of Southeast Asia and beyond.  Thus in a 1961 memo, 
Secretaries Rusk and McNamara argue that  
 
The loss of South Vietnam to Communism would involve the transfer of a 
nation of 20 million people from the free world to the Communist bloc. The loss 
of South Vietnam would make pointless any further discussion about the 
importance of Southeast Asia to the free world; we would have to face the near 
certainty that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would move to a 
complete accommodation with Communism if not formal incorporation within 
the Communist bloc….[That in turn] would not only destroy SEATO but would 
undermine the credibility of American commitments elsewhere.13 
 
For the Kennedy and later the Johnson administrations, what was at issue was not 
just Southeast Asia but the credibility and maintenance of US commitments 
everywhere.14 
Second, the fact that the threat in Vietnam was indirect meant that the United States 
had an interest in ensuring that the war did not expand into a direct threat to American 
security. While decision makers evaluated military options in terms of their effectiveness in 
Vietnam, they also considered their effect on the overall strategic situation of the United 
States: How would Communist China respond? Would the Soviets react by supplying arms 
to North Vietnam or by getting up to further mischief in Berlin? What would be the impact on 
                                            
13 Pentagon Papers [United States –Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967], IV.B.1, Evolution of the War 
Counterinsurgency: The Kennedy Commitments, 1961-1963. The Kennedy Commitments and 
Programs, National Archives Identifier: 5890493, ‘Memorandum for the President, Subject: South 
Vietnam’ (11 Nov. 1961) from Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vietnam Task Force, 125-126, 
available at: https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers/ (accessed 14 October 2015).  
14 The role of Vietnam in domestic politics is also noteworthy. In the early 1960s, as argued by Robert 
Dean, this centred on the likely political consequences of a ‘loss’ of Vietnam. See Robert D Dean, 
Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2001), esp. Chapter 8, 201-240. Later, as the escalation of US efforts 
continually failed to achieve US aims and as public opinion turned increasingly against the war, the 
domestic costs of the loss of Vietnam were less than the costs of continuing to fight.  
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what McGeorge Bundy later refers to as ‘nuclear danger’?15  US decision makers were clear 
that they did not want to take moves that would prompt Chinese or Soviet intervention in 
Vietnam or Soviet counter-moves in Europe. The US did not want to engage in a land war 
with China or start moving up an escalation ladder to nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis 
had made ‘nuclear danger’ clear for all to see, and while the US was engaged in Vietnam, it 
was also working on a variety of initiatives to lessen the danger of nuclear war. These would 
culminate in the 1963 Hot Line Agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, and the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968. As cooperation with the Soviet Union was essential 
for the success of these efforts to lessen the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, the US 
had to worry about repercussions of its actions in Vietnam on this aspect of US-Soviet 
relations as well. 
 Thus, the Vietnam War was a war fought within limits. These limits included the non-
use of biological, nuclear and lethal chemical weapons as well as a variety of limits on the 
use of air power, ground forces, and the geographical scope of US actions. The US 
government also drew the line at an expansion of war aims that would have involved regime 
change in North Vietnam, as they worried that this would prompt Chinese intervention and a 
strong Soviet reaction. However, it was not clear if the US could achieve its objectives within 
those limits, and policymakers at the time wrangled with the tension between limited means 
and unlimited ends.16 Ultimately, the US strategy was one of coercing the North Vietnamese 
to accept an independent, Western-oriented South Vietnam; it aimed to impose enough 
costs on the North Vietnamese that they would be willing to compromise. 
Third, US decision makers saw Vietnam as a new kind of war that required new ways 
of fighting. In a 1962 speech at West Point, Kennedy explained: 
 
This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war 
by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead 
of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by 
eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.…It 
requires…a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, 
and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.17 
 
In this new kind of war, it was difficult to draw a clear distinction between combatants and 
non-combatants. In addition, the battle was in a large part a battle for the allegiance of the 
                                            
15 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New 
York: Random House, 1988). 
16 Pentagon Papers [United States –Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967], IV.C.1 US Programs in South 
Vietnam, Nov. 1963-Apr. 1965; NSAM 273-NSAM 288- Honolulu, National Archives Identifier 
5890498, ‘Summary and Analysis’, from Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vietnam Task Force, i-vii, 
available at: https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers/ (accessed 14 October 2015).  
17 John F Kennedy, ‘Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the US Military Academy’, 6 
June 1962, available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8695 (accessed 18 March 2015). 
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people, which created a concern with the impact of particular weapons on ‘hearts and minds’ 
in Vietnam (in addition to American domestic and international public opinion). 
It also led in part to the fourth characteristic of the war, which was the US interest in 
exploring new technologies, both to increase US capabilities for this new type of war and to 
avoid sending (more and more) US combat forces.18 
 
Overview of Decisions Regarding Anti-Plant and Irritant Agents 
In this section, I sketch the sequence and timing of US decisions regarding the use of anti-
plant and irritant agents in order to lay a foundation for the analysis of military utility and 
norms that follows. 
The key decision-making on the use of anti-plant agents took place during the 
Kennedy administration. While Kennedy eventually granted approval for the use of anti-plant 
agents for both defoliation and crop destruction, approval for the latter lagged that of the 
former because Kennedy and his advisors saw food denial operations as more controversial. 
Despite this difference in timing, the pattern of approval was similar for both: first limited 
trials, then operational missions each of which required approved by decision makers in 
Washington, followed by the delegation of authority for approval of these missions to the 
American Ambassador and the US Mlitary Commander in Vietnam.  
More specifically, American policy makers discussed anti-plant agents as early as 
1961, as part of the effort to bring new technologies to bear in Vietnam, and later that same 
year anti-plant agents were tested for efficacy in the Vietnamese ecosystem.19 In November 
1961, the possible use of anti-plant agents went to President Kennedy for a decision. In his 
decision that same month, Kennedy distinguishes between defoliation and crop destruction, 
approving only a limited trial for the former, to gather data on both their tactical effectiveness 
and the political costs of use. NSAM 115 specifies that ‘there should be careful prior 
consideration and authorization by Washington of any plans developed by CINCPAC and 
the country team under this authority before any such plans are executed’.20 A year later, in 
                                            
18 See Eveyln Frances Krache Morris, Into the Wind: The Kennedy Administration and the Use of 
Herbicides in South Vietnam, PhD Dissertation, Georgetown University, 2012, 34. 
19 Lt. Gen. John H Hay Jr, Tactical and Materiel Innovations (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 1974), 89-90. General work on military applications for anti-plant agents began earlier; Lewy 
notes that that US defoliant tests began in 1958-59. See Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 1978), 257. 
 20 See Papers of John F Kennedy, Presidential Papers, National Security Files, Meetings and 
Memoranda. National Security Action Memoranda [NSAM]: NSAM 115, John F Kennedy Presidential 
Library and Museum, ‘National Security Action Memorandum Number 115: Defoliant Operations in 
Viet-NAM’, 30 Nov. 1961. JFKNSF-332-017, available at: http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Z8-
vBiaBdEW2Cz9g6NUB7g.aspx (downloaded 14 May 2014). Note that the ‘country team’ meant the 
American Ambassador and the United States military commander in Vietnam; the latter would have 
been the head of the Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam (MAAGV) or the head of the Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). MACV was established on 8 February 1962. 
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November 1962, Kennedy delegates the authority to approve specific defoliation operations 
to Saigon. Trial crop destruction operations received Presidential approval in October 
1962.21 At first, crop destruction operations required authorisation from Washington, 
although as with defoliation operations this is eventually delegated to Saigon in 1964.22 
Once the President delegated approval authority for anti-plant operations to Saigon, 
the use of these agents generally expands and retracts in line with the overall American 
effort in Vietnam. 23  The use of anti-plant agents reached a peak in 1968 and then 
decreased with the US draw down.24 Other factors also contributed to the decline in use of 
anti-plant agents, including a request from South Vietnamese President Thieu that 
defoliation operations be limited to remote areas and increasing public opposition to the war 
overall and to the use of herbicides.25 One of the most important causes of the decline in use 
                                            
21 Charles V Collins, ‘Herbicide Operations in Southeast Asia’, Project CHECO Report, AD-779 776 
(San Francisco: Department of the Air Force, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, 11 October 1967), 29-
31, available at: www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=AD0779796 (downloaded 3 March  2015); 9. 
22 Collins, ‘Herbicide Operations’, 11. Buckingham reports that before October 1964, the Vietnamese 
Air Force carried out all crop destruction operations; the first missions involving US planes took place 
on 3 October 1964. The American planes carried South Vietnamese markings and were ‘ostensibly 
under the control of a South Vietnamese “aircraft commander.”’ See William A Buckingham, Jr., 
Operation Ranch Hand: The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 1961-1971 (Washington, 
DC: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1982), 104-105. 
23 See Jeanne Mager Stellman, Steven D Stellman, Richard Christian, Tracy Weber and Carrie 
Tomasallo, ‘The Extent and Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam’, 
Nature 422 (17 April 2003), ‘Figure 5, Time course of herbicide sorties from 1961-1971’, page 685; 
Institute of Medicine, [Committee to Review the Health Effects in Vietnam of Exposure to Herbicides], 
Veterans and Agent Orange: Health Effects of Herbicides Used in Vietnam (Washington DC: National 
Academies Press, 1994), ‘Table 3-1, Summary of US Military Strength in Vietnam and Quantities of 
Herbicide Sprayed (million gallons): 1960-1973’, 77. In Table 3-1, the figures provided for the quantity 
of herbicides do not reflect the corrections made by Stellman et al., ‘Extent and Patterns of Usage’. 
For the data on quantity of herbicides, see National Research Council (NRC), [Committee on the 
Effects of Herbicides in Vietnam, Division of Biological Sciences, Assembly of Life Sciences], The 
Effects of Herbicides in South Vietnam, Part A—Summary and Conclusions (Washington, DC: 
National Academy of Sciences, 1974), Table 1, ‘Application of Herbicides in the Vietnam War by  
Year’, page S-1. Note that geographic expansion also occurred; on use in Laos, see Stellman et al., 
‘Extent and Patterns of Usage’, 685-6. 
24 See Buckingham, Operation Ranch Hand, 160 on the pressure to cut back anti-plant operations as 
the Nixon administration undertakes its policy of Vietnamization. 
25 See Buckingham, Operation Ranch Hand, 161-171; Paul Frederick Cecil, Herbicidal Warfare: The 
RANCH HAND Project in Vietnam (NY: Praeger, 1986), 150. As Stellman et al. note, the use of anti-
plant agents were ‘a matter of scientific controversy from their inception’ (‘Extent and pattern of 
Usage’, 681). This scientific opposition to the use of anti-plant agents played a key role in constraining 
policymakers to examine and re-examine the costs and benefits of anti-plant agents. The Institute of 
Medicine dates ‘public concern over the use of herbicides in Vietnam’ to 1964, citing Young and 
Reggiani on a statement published by the Federation of American Scientists (Veterans and Agent 
Orange 1994, 29); see also AL Young and GM Reggiani, Agent Orange and its Associated Dioxin: 
Assessment of a Controversy (NY: Elsevier 1988). However, the FAS statement focuses largely on 
lethal chemical and biological agents and does not specifically address anti-plant agents. See ‘FAS 
Statement on Biological and Chemical Warfare’, Bulletin of Atomics Scientists 20/8 (1964), 46-47. I 
have been unable to find much evidence of concern on the part of the general public over the use of 
herbicides until after the 1969 release of the Bionetics report that showed 2,4,5-T was potentially 
harmful. See Bionetics Research Laboratories, Evaluation of Carcinogenic, Teratogenic and 
Mutagenic Activities of Selected Pesticides and Industrial Chemicals, Vols. I-III, NTIS PB223 161 
(Bethesda, MD: Bionetics Research Labs, 1968), available at 
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was the 1969 publication of the finding that Agent Orange posed a danger to human 
health.26 At that point, in October 1969, the DOD restricted the use of Agent Orange to areas 
remote from populations. In April 1970, the use of Agent Orange was suspended completely, 
and the last fixed wing defoliation mission was flown in in May. Crop destruction operations 
continued for another few months, but in December, the White House announced an ‘orderly 
yet rapid phase out of the herbicide program’.27 Estimates of the total amount of herbicide 
and the total amount of land sprayed in Vietnam have varied. Based on records of Air Force 
spray missions, Stellman et al. estimate that from 1961-1971, almost 77 million litres of 
herbicides were sprayed from aircraft over 2,631,297 hectares.28  
The use of irritant agents unfolded differently. The key period of top policy-maker 
involvement was in the Johnson Administration, particularly from 1965-1966. Several earlier 
events helped pave the way for use:  First, the French left behind some irritant agents when 
they withdrew from Indochina in 1956.29 Second, US policy on the use of irritant agents 
changed in 1960. For the first time, the Basic National Security Policy distinguished between 
irritant agents and other chemical weapons, and declared that Presidential authorisation was 
not required for the use of irritant agents.30 Third, the US began routine issuing of irritant 
                                            
http://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/items/show/4099 (downloaded 20 October 2015). Dow 
Chemical, which produced both Agent Orange and napalm, was a key target of protests, but news 
coverage suggests that napalm and not Agent Orange was the focus. For more on the controversy 
over the use of herbicides, see Institute of Medicine, Veterans and Agent Orange,  1994, esp. 
Chapter 2, 23 -73; David Zierler, The Invention of Ecocide: Agent Orange, Vietnam, and the Scientists 
Who Changed the Way We Think about the Environment (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011); 
GM Reggiani, ‘Historical Overview of the Controversy Surrounding Agent Orange’ in Agent Orange 
and its Associated Dioxin: Assessment of a Controversy eds. AL Young and GM Reggiani (New York: 
Elsevier, 1988), 31-76. 
26 Bionetics Research Laboratories, Evaluation of Carcinogenic, Teratogenic and Mutagenic Activities.  
27 Cecil, Herbicidal Warfare, 152.  
28 See Stellman et al., ‘Extent and Pattern of Usage’, esp. Table 1, ‘Use of Military Herbicides in 
Vietnam (1961-1971)’, 682 and Table 2, ‘Estimated Area and Frequency of Spraying’, 685; see also 
Institute of Medicine, Committee to Review the Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to 
Herbicides (Ninth Biennial Update). Veterans and Agent Orange: Update 2012 (National Academies 
Press, 2014), Table 3-1, ‘Military Use of Herbicides in Vietnam (1961-1971), 5; see also NRC, Effects 
of Herbicides. Note other branches of the US military also used anti-plant agents, though Stellman et 
al. estimate that this amounted to less than 5% of the total amount of agent used. See Stellman et al. 
681-2. Australian forces also used anti-plant agents in Vietnam.   
29 ‘Excerpts from ‘Transcript of Rusk News Parley on Use of Gas in Vietnam’, New York Times, 25 
March 1965.  
30 The Eisenhower Administration amended 1959 Basic National Security Policy on 24 August 1960. 
See FRUS, 1958–1960, Volume III, Doc. 114. The original policy was that ‘the United States will be 
prepared to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that such use will enhance the military 
effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision as to their use will be made by the President’. See 
FRUS, 1958–1960, Volume III, Doc. 70, ‘NSC 5906/1’, 5 Aug. 1959. Preliminary research suggests 
that the amendment was motivated in part by concern about the ability of the US to fight a limited war 
without the use of nuclear weapons. Note also that in February 1962, Dr Herbert York (Director of 
Research and Engineering for the Department of Defense) and General Lyman Lemnitzer (Army 
Chief of Staff) briefed the National Security Council on ‘technological developments in non-lethal 
weaponry [including tear gas] and military doctrine for possible use’. See FRUS 1958–1960, Volume 
III, Doc. 92. 
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agents to some US troops and allies; with State Department approval, South Vietnam began 
to receive US irritant agents in 1962.31 Finally, as discussed below, the US military wanted to 
explore the potential of these agents, including for the conflict in Vietnam, and as part of this 
exploration the US Army carried out a full-scale troop test of CS in Operation Water Bucket 
at Fort Campbell, KY in June 1963.32 
The first use of irritant agents in South Vietnam was for domestic riot-control purposes, 
during the Buddhist Crisis in 1963.33 South Vietnamese troops again used irritant agents 
against rioters in November 1964. In the meantime, in early 1964, MACV examined the 
potential for riot control and incapacitating agents in RVN Counterinsurgency operations; 
MACV then requested ‘authority for the tactical employment of these munitions’.34 In 
response to a CINCPAC request, plans ‘for the use of CS gas on both wide-spread and 
limited scale’ were summited by COMUSMACV, ‘with recommendations that the initial use of 
CS gas be conducted by the Vietnamese, for RVNAF already possessed the capability to 
initiate such use and therefore heavy US involvement would not be necessary’.35  The first 
use in combat came in late 1964, in operations that aimed to rescue American POWs.36 
According to Hay, in February 1965 Westmoreland told those under his command that 
                                            
31 Secretary of State Rusk ‘made it clear that the State Department approved the original shipments of 
the gases in 1962’. See John Finney, ‘Rusk Defends Use of Nonlethal Gas in War in Vietnam’, New 
York Times, 25 March 1965. Note that there is some disagreement in the secondary literature about 
the type of agents that were issued; Lewy states that the US supplied CS, CN and DM, while Hersh 
argues that DM was not supplied until 1964. See Lewy, America in Vietnam, 248; Seymour Hersh, 
Chemical and Biological Warfare: America’s Hidden Arsenal (NY: The Bobbs–Merrill Company, 
1968), 167-168. For a description of these different irritant agents, see Michael Crowley, Chemical 
Control: Regulation of Incapacitating Chemical Agent Weapons, Riot Control Agents and their Means 
of Delivery (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 39-44. 
32 On Operation Water Bucket, see Sherman L. Davis, ‘Riot Control Weapons for the Vietnam War’, 
Historical Monograph AMC 56M (Maryland: Edgewood Arsenal, June 1970), 4. I thank Reid Kirby for 
providing me with a copy of this. 
33 This incident came to the attention of top policy makers because of the possible use of mustard 
gas. See FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, eds. Edward C Keefer and 
Louis J Smith (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 1991), Docs. 146-149 and 151; see 
also D. Hank Ellison, Chemical Warfare during the Vietnam War: Riot Control Agents in Combat (New 
York: Routledge, 2011), 9-11. 
34 History Branch, Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff, Command History, United States Military 
Assistance Command Vietnam [US MACV], 1964 (San Francisco. CA: 1965), 95, available at: 
http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA955106&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed 6 
May 2015). 
35 History Branch, Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff, Command History, US MACV 1964, 95-96. 
36 For the details of these first uses, see Military History Branch, Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff, 
HQ MACV, Command History: US MACV 1965 (SF: US MACV, 1966); Ellison, Chemical Warfare, 11-
14; Military Assistance Advisory Group, ‘Lessons Learned Number 51: Operational Employment of 
Riot Control Munitions’, 24 April 1965, available from the Combined Arms Research Library, Digital 
Library, at http://server16040.contentdm.oclc.org/u?/p4013coll11,1488 (downloaded 10 June 2014);  
see also General Westmoreland’s report on these first uses of irritant agents in ‘Riot Control 
Munitions’, 23 March 1965, available  at Riot Control Munitions,  23 March 1965, Folder 11, Box 08, 
George J. Veith Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University, accessed 12 
May 2015, <http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=3670811036>.   
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irritant agents could be used for self-defence.37 In March 1965, Peter Arnet’s story on the 
American use of irritant agents sparked both domestic and international protest. This lead to 
a temporary pause in use, as the Johnson Administration scrambled to respond to the 
barrage of criticism. In September 1965, Lt. Col. Leon Utter made unauthorised use of 
irritant agent in a situation where civilians were intermingled with combatants. The media 
emphasized the ‘humanitarian’ use of irritant agents in this case, and the political mood 
changed.38 Westmoreland gained permission to use irritant agents in one specific mission on 
8 October, and in November, the Department of Defense affirmed his overall authority to use 
these agents.39 In December, Westmoreland issued instructions that permitted ‘unrestricted 
use of CS and CN at the discretion of the senior commander concerned’.40  
As the war expanded so did the use of irritant agents. Irritant agents were publicly 
justified as the more humane option when civilians were intermingled with combatants, but 
they were used in a wide variety of tactical situations, including to clear and render 
uninhabitable a variety of fortifications (including tunnels and caves), to help clear landing 
areas for helicopters, and in urban combat, particularly in Hue.41 US forces also used these 
agents in conjunction with—and to maximise the lethality of—conventional weapons.42 Lewy 
reports that ‘between fiscal year 1965 and fiscal year 1969, procurement of CS for Southeast 
Asia underwent a 24-fold increase’ and that ‘by 30 June 1969, some 13.7 million pounds of 
                                            
37 Hay, Tactical and Materiel Innovations, 34. 
38 Two editorials in the New York Times illustrate the change in opinion: ‘Gas (nonlethal) in Vietnam’, 
published on 24 March 1965, argues that ‘gas is a wretched means to achieve even the most valid 
ends’. In contrast, the 11 September 1965 editorial, ‘Using Tear Gas in Vietnam’, argues that 
‘nonlethal riot-control gases can be far more humane and will cause far fewer casualties than many of 
the weapons now being used in Vietnam’. In supporting General Westmoreland’s request for a 
reaffirmation of authority to use irritant agents in Vietnam, Bundy notes that ‘even the New York 
Times is resoundingly with us on this’. See FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. III, Vietnam, June-December 
1965, eds. David C Humphrey, Edward C Keefer and Louis J Smith (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1996), Doc. 150,  ‘Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant 
for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson’, 23 Sept. 1965. 
39 See Hay, Tactical and Material Innovation, 36. For General Westmoreland’s recollections, see 
William C Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: De Cap Press, 1989), 278-279. Davis makes 
a distinction between defensive and offensive use. He states, ‘Before the fall of 1965 CS was not 
authorised for battlefield use in Vietnam by the theatre command, although American personnel had 
been authorized protective masks and CS grenades for use in self-defense’. See Davis, ‘Riot Control 
Weapons’, 10. 
40 Military History Branch, Command History MACV 1965, 444.  
41 Hay, Tactical and Materiel Innovation; Ellison, Chemical Warfare; ‘Combat Operations After Action 
Report (Operation Hue City)’ 20 March 1968, available at the Combined Arms Research Library 
Digital Library at http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll11/id/1403 (accessed 1 
April 2016).  
42 See ‘US Explains New Tactic’, New York Times, 22 February 1966, accessed through ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers. 
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CS had been used'.43   The US continued to use irritant agents until it withdrew its forces 
from Vietnam. 44 
 
Consequentialist versus Appropriateness Logics 
As part of their disagreement about the influence of military utility and norms, realists and 
constructivists disagree about the relative importance of two different logics of decision-
making. In examining the role played by military utility and norms, we therefore need to look 
first at the logic of decisions and then at whether and how policy-makers incorporated 
military utility and norms into that logic. 
As developed by March and Olson, the logic of anticipated consequences is largely 
based on the costs and benefits of a proposed course of action, while the logic of 
appropriateness is largely based on an understanding of the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of an 
action, on the appropriateness of the action for the identity of the actor involved.45  
Tannenwald connects the logic of consequences with a materialist explanation in her work 
on the nuclear taboo, arguing that 
a purely materialist explanation would expect to see decision-making 
about nuclear use reflect cost-benefit type thinking in terms of ‘non-norms’ 
factors such as fear of escalation, global war, or long-term retaliation, the 
military utility of nuclear weapons, weapons availability, the costs and 
feasibility of nuclear weapons and their alternatives, or the long-term 
military consequences of using nuclear weapons. Decision-
making…would evaluate the nuclear option in terms of consequences for 
US military interests, not in terms of whether it was inherently ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’.46 
 
US decision-making on the use of anti-plant and irritant agents in the Vietnam War was 
dominated by this kind of concern with consequences; norms worked instrumentally, by 
raising the (potential) costs associated with the use of anti-plant and irritant agents. 
Discussions focused on technical and tactical effectiveness in Vietnam and the impact of use 
on overall US strategic aims; policy makers then weighed military utility against political 
costs. US decision makers constantly asserted that if the benefits of use outweighed the 
costs, then the weapons should be used. As will be discussed in more detail below, they 
                                            
43 Lewy, America in Vietnam, 250. 
44 By April of 1970, the use of these agents was reportedly decreasing. See Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Rise of CB Weapons, Vol. 1 of The Problem of Chemical and 
Biological Warfare (New York: Humanities Press 1971), 191. 
45 See March and Olsen, ‘Institutional Dynamics’. As they note on p. 954, these logics are not 
exclusionary. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink suggest that the appropriateness logic may 
become more prominent over the life-cycle of a norm. See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 
‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization 52/4, 895, see also 
912-914. 
46 Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 51. 
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also saw the political costs as subject to manipulation, and developed strategies to minimise 
these costs. 
The November 1961 decision about the use of anti-plant agents provides a good 
example of the logic of consequences at work. In National Security Memorandum 115, 
President Kennedy gave approval for a limited use of defoliants for route clearance, while 
postponing operations for food denial, border control, and other anti-plant operations until 
particular conditions were met.47 Before granting approval, the President received memos 
from both the Department of Defense and from the Department of State.  
In the Defense memo, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric laid out the logic of the 
decision: The ‘basic problem is to weigh the political/military effects of the program within 
Vietnam, along with the possibility of adverse reactions by nations outside Vietnam’.48 He 
recognised that a logic of consequences does not necessarily lead to a decision for use, and 
presented two possibilities. One was to not to use any anti-plant chemicals ‘wholly on the 
grounds of net adverse local reaction, and particularly of worldwide disapproval’.49  Gilpatric 
left this to the Department of State to judge. The second possibility was ‘to go ahead with a 
selective and carefully controlled program starting with the clearance of key routes, 
proceeding thereafter to food denial only if the most careful basis of resettlement and 
alternative food supply has been created, and holding Zone D and the border areas until we 
have realistic possibilities of immediate military exploitation’.50 Gilpatric stated that ‘the 
Department of Defense is inclined toward the latter decision’.51 
The State Department memo did not challenge the consequentialist logic. Instead, 
Secretary Rusk argued that the military benefits outweighed the political costs and agreed 
with Gilpatric’s recommendations.52 He acknowledged that there would be an ‘intense 
                                            
47 Papers of John F Kennedy, Presidential Papers, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda. 
National Security Action Memoranda [NSAM]: NSAM 115, Defoliant Operations in Vietnam, JFKNSF-
332-017, John F Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, ‘National Security Action Memorandum 
No. 115’, 30 Nov. 1961, available at: http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Z8-
vBiaBdEW2Cz9g6NUB7g.aspx (downloaded 14 May 2014).  
48 Papers of John F Kennedy, Presidential Papers, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, 
National Security Action Memoranda [NSAM]: NSAM 115, Defoliant Operations in Vietnam, JFKNSF-
332-017, John F Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Roswell Gilpatric, ‘Memorandum for the 
President, Subject: Defoliant Operations in Vietnam’, 21 Nov. 1961, available at: 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKNSF-332-017.aspx (downloaded 20 October 
2015).  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 1, Vietnam, 1961, eds. Ronald D Landa and Charles S Sampson 
(Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988), Doc. 275, Dean Rusk, ‘Memorandum from 
the Secretary of State to the President’, 24 Nov. 1961; see also Jack Schulimson, The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and the War in Vietnam: 1960-1968, Part 1 (Washington DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), 148-150. 
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Communist “germ warfare” campaign’. 53  However, Rusk did not give this much weight, as 
he was ‘satisfied that successful plant-killing operations in Vietnam, carefully coordinated 
with and incidental to larger operations, can be of substantial assistance in the control and 
defeat of the Viet Cong’.54 Thus both Gilpatric and Rusk employed consequentialist logic, 
and both agreed that the military benefits outweighed the political costs. 
While this kind of consequentialist logic was present in decision after decision 
regarding the use of anti-plant and irritant agents by the US in Vietnam, there are also 
examples of appropriateness arguments. In March 1965, Michael Stewart, Britain’s Foreign 
Secretary, criticised the US use of irritant agents in Vietnam and implied that it was 
inappropriate when he called on the ‘US Government in determining the military measures it 
took to pay “a decent respect for the opinions of mankind”’.55 However, while this challenge 
to the appropriateness of irritant agents annoyed President Johnson, it did not prompt a 
reappraisal of the use of these agents among American policymakers.56 
Another example of an appropriateness logic occurred when the Kennedy 
administration re-considered crop destruction in the fall of 1962. Edward Murrow, the 
Director of the US Information Agency argued that ‘we have a tradition in this country of not 
using food as a weapon of war;’ he added that ‘chemical and biological warfare are subjects 
which arouse emotional reactions at least as intense as those aroused by nuclear warfare’.57 
However, he opened his argument with a paragraph that gave military utility precedence 
over political costs, stating that  
If we will win Vietnam with defoliants, but lose without them, then we must 
use them. If we will probably win with defoliants and probably lose without 
them, then also we must use them. If we might win with defoliants, and 
might win without them, then we had better consider the implications 
before undertaking’ the proposed trial of chemical crop destruction.58 
 
Murrow ends his memo with the request that if the pilot program is carried out, his team be 
given time to ‘explain to the world what we are doing and why. This will reduce, to some 
extent, the impact of the inevitable Communist propaganda campaign’.59 The structure of the 
                                            
53 FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 1, Doc. 275. 
54 FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 1, Doc. 275. 
55 ‘US told of British Concern on Vietnam: America Urged to Respect “Opinions of Mankind”’, The 
Guardian, 24 March 1965, accessed through ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
56 On Johnson’s reaction, see FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. II, Vietnam, January-June 1965, eds. David C 
Humphrey, Ronald D Landa and Louis J Smith (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 
1996), Doc. 216, ‘Editorial Note’; see also FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. II, Doc. 330, ‘Memorandum from 
the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson’, 3 June 
1965. 
57 FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. II, Vietnam, 1962, eds. John P Glennon, David M Baehler and Charles S 
Simpson (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990), Doc. 266, 16 Aug. 1962. Note that 
the project in Phu Yen was for crop destruction. 
58 FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. II, Doc. 266. 
59 FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. II, Doc. 266. 
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memo is suggestive—the first paragraph provided what might be an obligatory deference to 
military effectiveness. It served as a statement of Murrow’s allegiance to the cause (if we will 
win with them and lost without them, we must use them).60 He then presented his criticisms 
not in absolute terms but in terms of potential political costs, and concluded the memo with a 
strategy for reducing the political costs associated with the use of these agents. Thus, 
despite his concern with the use of these agents, he focussed on consequences and gave 
more weight to issues of military utility.  
While historically, ‘conscience’, ‘civilization’, and ‘the opinion of mankind’ figure in 
American policy pronouncements on chemical weapons, in the 1960s the Kennedy and 
Johnson Administrations did not accept that these terms had relevance for the use of anti-
plant or irritant agents.61 While American decision makers recognised that others might 
disagree, they decided that the military utility of the agents outweighed any political costs 
that might arise from that disagreement.62 Indeed, the US held to this positon despite 
evidence that many members of the United Nations thought the Geneva Protocol did cover 
anti-plant and irritant agents.63  
Thus, the dominant logic of action in US decision-making on the use of both anti-plant 
and irritant agents was one of consequences, not appropriateness. As we will see in more 
detail in the following sections, norms did figure into this consequentialist reasoning, but they 
appeared largely as a generator of ‘political costs’ that policymakers saw as manipulable and 
as outweighed by the military benefits. 
                                            
60 Dean argues that in George Ball’s memos criticising US policy, Ball carefully established his 
commitment to the cause before challenging the proposed means, and instead of challenging the 
wisdom of an interventionist US policy, he addressed the question in terms of whether the costs of 
intervention outweighed the benefits. See Dean, Imperial Brotherhood, 235. 
61 For earlier statements, see George Bunn, ‘Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should the 
United States Agree?’ Wisconsin Law Review 1969 (375), 399; ‘President Franklin D Roosevelt’s 
Statement on the Use of Poison Gas’, White House Press Release, 5 June 1942, available at 
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/420605b.html (downloaded 19 June 2014); Franklin D 
Roosevelt, ‘Statement Warning the Axis Against Using Poison Gas’, 8 June 1943, online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16407. 
62 As Brian Rappert demonstrates in his discussion of cluster bombs and International Humanitarian 
Law, we can also ask questions about the process by which military benefits and political costs are 
evaluated and the extent to which they are actually weighed against each other. See Brian Rappert, 
How to Look Good In a War: Justifying and Challenging State Violence (London, Pluto Press, 2012). I 
thank one of my anonymous reviewers for recommending Rappert. There are also interesting 
questions to ask about who did the weighing, who did the evaluating, and who had the status to 
challenge conclusions. The question of who has the status to challenge is raised in the science and 
technology literature in terms of scientific arguments; this case suggests that the military is in a 
privileged position when it comes to judgements about military utility. 
63 A short overview of discussions at the UN is provided in US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (ACDA), ‘The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Johnson Administration, 
II. Policy and Negotiations, K. Other Measures, 2. Chemical And Biological Weapons’, Final Draft, no 
date. Declassified Documents Reference System [DDRS], Gale, Doc. number CK3100335632, 11-13 
and 15. 
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The Role of Military Utility 
The previous section examined the logic of decision-making that policy makers employed 
when determining whether to use anti-plant and irritant agents in Vietnam. In the 
consequentialist logic employed, policy makers weighed the military benefits of use against 
the political costs. This concern with military utility accords with structural realism’s 
expectations. Structural realism argues that the anarchic nature of the international system 
constrains states to be concerned with security.64 While realists understand the effect of 
anarchy and other structural characteristics to be constraining and not determinative, their 
expectation is that, particularly in times of war, a weapon’s military utility will play a primary 
role in a state’s decision regarding its use. 
William Truehart’s explanation of Ambassador Notting’s position on area bombing 
and crop destruction illustrates this constraint: 
Given the fairly desperate position we find ourselves in in Vietnam, he wants 
to be very sure of his ground before rejecting any weapon which might help to 
win the war, and he is understandably reluctant to draw conclusions on vital 
questions on the basis of a priori reasoning—which is about all we have to go 
on at this point.65 
 
As I demonstrate below, a concern with military utility dominated American decision-making 
on the use of anti-plant and irritant agents in Vietnam. Three types of military utility received 
attention: technical effectiveness (would the weapon have the desired result on the target?), 
tactical utility (would use of the weapon help to accomplish US goals in Vietnam?), and 
strategic effectiveness (would the weapon help to accomplish US strategic goals overall?).66 
As we will see, to reach a decision about use policy makers weighed military utility against 
political costs. 
 
Technical effectiveness 
Technical effectiveness refers to whether a weapon ‘works’ in a narrow, technical sense: 
Does it have the desired result on the target? Compared to other aspects of military utility, 
this one is relatively clear: a gun may repeatedly fail to discharge a bullet; a chemical agent 
may fail to have an effect on the plants on which it is sprayed; airdropped bombs may fail to 
ignite a self-sustaining forest fire.67 At the same time, we should not exaggerate the clear-cut 
                                            
64 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
65 FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. II, 1962, Doc. 58, ‘Letter from the Deputy Chief of Mission in Vietnam 
(Truehart) to the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell)’, 12 Feb. 1962. 
66 Decision makers were concerned with the military utility of ‘conventional’ weapons as well—this is 
clearest in the debates over the conventional bombing of North Vietnam. 
67 Repeated attempts to start forest fires in Vietnam failed and were eventually abandoned. See the 
discussion of ‘Project “Pink Rose”’ in Collins, ‘Herbicide Operations’; see also Joseph Trevithick, 
‘Firestorm: Forest Fires as a Weapon in Vietnam’, 13 June 2012, available at  
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nature of technical effectiveness; as Donald MacKenzie argues, a central conclusion from 
the sociology of scientific knowledge is the ‘in-principle challengeability of all technical 
arguments’.68 He further argues that ‘what constitutes an adequate test of a weapon is a 
socially negotiated matter’.69 Nonetheless, in this case American decision makers treated 
technical effectiveness as a technical question that was subject to a clear answer.70 
In Vietnam, the technical effectiveness of anti-plant weapons was less certain than 
was the technical effectiveness of irritant agents, for two reasons. First, in the early 1960s 
irritant agents were further developed as a weapon than were anti-plant agents.71 Indeed, 
when the controversy over the use of irritant agents broke out in March 1965, McGeorge 
Bundy explained to President Johnson that irritant weapons ‘are standard issue for all US 
troops with riot-control missions….[and] are also standard issue under Military Assistance 
Programs to friendly troops with riot-control missions’.72 In contrast, there were no 
standardised chemical anti-plant agents or weapons in the arsenal.73 Second, while anti-
plant agents were in use domestically for civilian purposes and known to be effective against 
plant life in the US, it was not known whether the agents would be effective against the 
plants and in the climate of Vietnam.  
                                            
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/firestorm-forest-fires-as-a-weapon-in-vietnam.htm (accessed 15 
October 2015); Annie Jacobsen, The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncensored History of DARPA, America’s 
Top Secret Military Research Agency (NY: Little, Brown and Comp., 2015), 191-193. 
68 Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 130; see also Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, eds., The 
Social Shaping of Technology 2nd edition (Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press, 1999), esp. the 
chapter by Ronald Kline and Trevor Pinch, ‘The Social Construction of Technology’, 113-115. 
69 Donald MacKenzie, ‘Towards an Historical Sociology of Nuclear Weapons Technologies’, in Arms 
Races: Technological and Political Dynamics eds. Nils Petter Gleditsch and Olav Njolstad (London: 
Sage 1990), 135. See also MacKenzie and Wajcman, ‘Introduction: Military Technology’ in 
MacKenzie and Wajcman, eds., The Social Shaping of Technology, 347, and James Fallows, ‘The 
American Army and the M-16 Rifle’ in MacKenzie and Wajcman eds. The Social Shaping of 
Technology, 382-394 for a discussion of effectiveness, organisational politics and the M16 rifle. 
70 MacKenzie argues that technical facts are part of a web of knowledge, and that social forces 
influence both how facts are constructed and who has the credibility to challenge facts in a specific 
context. See MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy. This is suggestive for this case: as above, American 
decision makers took the findings of scientists about technical utility as fact and fed them into the 
policy process without challenge. It is suggestive in other ways as well: First, civilian scientists played 
a key role in criticising US policy on anti-plant and irritant agents, and second, this directs our 
attention to the role of the military as experts in a national security context and the difficulty of 
challenging their conclusions regarding tactical utility. 
71 Davis reports that together with four munitions for its use, CS was ‘standardised…as the riot control 
agent of choice on 30 June 1959’. See Davis, Riot Control Weapons, 3. The United States had 
researched herbicides but did not use them in either World War II or Korea. On the development of 
military herbicides, see Buckingham, Operation Ranch Hand, 1-8; AL Young, The History, Use, 
Disposition and Environmental Fate of Agent Orange (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2009), esp. Ch. 2, 
23-55;  William F Warren, ‘A Review of the Herbicide Program in South Vietnam’, Commander in 
Chief Pacific, Scientific Advisory Group, Working Paper No. 10-68, AD-779 797 (August 1968) 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/779797.pdf.  
72 See FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. II, Doc. 210, 23 March 1965. 
73 There was at least one standardized biological anti-plant, wheat rust. My research to date has 
discovered no discussion of the use of anti-plant biological agents in Vietnam; I will address the 
significance of this absence in future work. 
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Anti-plant agents received attention in the Vietnam context as early as April 1961, as 
part of the effort to explore ‘which of the various techniques and gadgets now available or 
being explored might be relevant and useful in the Vietnam operation’.74  The following 
month, Kennedy received a proposed program of Action for Vietnam. Among other things, it 
suggested the development of ‘modern technological area-denial techniques’ to help control 
the border, as well as the establishment of a Combat Development and Test Center (CDTC) 
to develop new technologies for use against the Viet Cong.75 In June, William Godel, Deputy 
Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense, visited 
Vietnam where he met with US and Vietnamese officials. He described various items that 
the Combat and Development Test Center might develop, including anti-plant agents for 
crop destruction and defoliation.76 The CDTC was established quickly, and it conducted the 
first tests of anti-plant agents in Vietnam in August. By 2 October, the American Embassy in 
Saigon reported that the ‘initial tests have been successful’ and that plans for use were in 
development.77  
That same month the President sent General Maxwell Taylor to Vietnam to assess 
how the US could best support South Vietnam against increased VC activity. In his report, 
Taylor lists ‘manioc and rice plant destructrant’ as well as ‘Zone D and Border defoliant’ as 
items that, in testing, have ‘demonstrated sufficient utility to justify the introduction of 
operational quantities’.78 However, technical effectiveness is only one aspect of military 
utility; decision makers also considered tactical and strategic utility.  
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75 The plan was a product of the Presidential Task Force on Vietnam, headed by Roswell Gilpatric.  
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76 See FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. I, Doc. 96, ‘Editorial Note’. As reported here, President Diem expressed 
his interest in the development of a defoliant during Godel’s visit. 
77 Buckingham, Operation Ranch Hand, 11; FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. I, Doc. 143, ‘Telegram from the 
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78 Papers of John F Kennedy, Presidential Papers, National Security Files, Countries, Vietnam: 
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Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, available at: http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-
Viewer/Archives/JFKNSF-203-005.aspx (Accessed 14 May 2014).  
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Tactical utility 
A weapon has tactical utility if it helps to advance the purposes of the user within the 
theatre of operations; a weapon can have tactical utility in some contexts and not others. For 
policy makers, the question was whether anti-plant and irritant agents had utility in the 
Vietnam War. Here we will look first at anti-plant agents and then at irritant agents, 
examining arguments about tactical utility and how that utility was weighed against political 
costs. 
 
The tactical utility of anti-plant agents: The military logic for the use of anti-plant weapons 
depends on whether we are talking about the use of these agents for defoliation or for crop 
destruction. The military logic of defoliation was that it would increase visibility and by doing 
so, help to prevent ambush and allow easier location of the enemy; its use was proposed 
along lines of communication, along the border to help counter infiltration, and in combat 
zones.79 However, there were those in the Kennedy Administration who challenged this 
logic. For example, according to a memo prepared in the State Department, ‘While visibility 
is without question improved by defoliation, RGK Thompson and some of our own military 
say the remaining tree trunks, limbs and twigs often provide quite adequate cover’.80 In other 
words, even if defoliation was technically effective and improved visibility, the VC could still 
use the general landscape and tree remaining branches and tree trunks for coverage during 
an ambush. Further, according to Robert Johnson, Walt Rostow suggested that defoliation 
simply cleared the way for the VC, because improved lines of sight can work to the 
advantage of both the defender and the attacker.81    
In their discussions, policymakers weighed the potential military gains against the 
potential political costs. They discounted the latter, in part because the proposed use on 
lines of communication was similar to the domestic use of defoliants along highways and 
railroad lines. Policy makers were cautious, however, and as mentioned above in November 
                                            
79 See, for example, FRUS 1961-63 Vol. I, Doc. 343, 28 Dec. 1961; see also SIPRI, Rise of CB 
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1961 Kennedy approved only a limited trial, evaluation of which would provide a basis for 
further decisions.82 
A year later, in November 1962, McNamara wrote again to the President, requesting 
approval for five specific operations and the transfer of authority to approve defoliation 
operations to the US Ambassador in Vietnam and the Commander of the US Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV). He reported low political costs, high 
technical effectiveness, and tactical utility in terms of increased visibility and a reduction in 
‘the susceptibility of the sprayed areas to ambush’.83 According to McNamara, the tactical 
military benefits of defoliation operations were greater than their political costs, and the 
President thus agreed to McNamara’s recommendations.84  
The military argument for crop destruction was that it would deny South Vietnamese 
crops to the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers, and that any additional effort they 
had to expend on food lessened the effort they could spend on military activities.85 There 
were arguments about whether the conditions in South Vietnam were appropriate for this—
some argued that crop destruction would not have a significant effect, either because food 
was too abundant in South Vietnam or because it was relatively easy for the North 
Vietnamese to bring in the supplies that they needed.86 However, the general logic of how 
crop destruction was to contribute to the US war effort was clear.  
The policy discussion centred on whether crop destruction would undermine US 
efforts in the struggle for political allegiance. This was in part due to uncertainty about 
whether it was possible to distinguish between crops that would be used by the enemy (the 
destruction of which could provide military gain) and crops that would be used by civilians 
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Papers of John F Kennedy, Presidential Papers, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, 
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83 FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. II, Doc. 317, ‘Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to 
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85 See, for example, Cable, Ambassador Nolting the Secretary of State, 25 Aug. 1962, Papers of John 
F Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, Box 196, Folder: ‘Vietnam, General, 8/23/62-8/31/62’, 
Item 10, John F Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum [JFKL]. 
86 See, for example, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. II, Doc. 250, ‘Memorandum from the Director of the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 
Affairs (Harriman), 28 July 1962. 
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(the destruction of which would create animosity and potentially help the Viet Cong in the 
struggle for hearts and minds).87 
Thus, in April 1962, the Department of State advised the American Embassy in 
Saigon that that the ‘primary consideration of any crop destruction program is to ensure that 
it will not result in US and GVN absorbing adverse propaganda criticism and adverse local 
reaction without achieving any commensurate military advantage’.88 The President’s staff 
then informed both the State and the Defense Departments that the President should not 
receive a request to supply chemicals to the GVN for crop destruction until there was 
evidence for both technical and tactical effectiveness. Specifically, the President required  
a thorough discussion of all of the factors can be assembled, including: 1) 
scientific assurance based upon extensive testing that the herbicides are 
completely effective [and] 2) a selection of targets based upon sound 
intelligence, which would justify the conclusion that crop destruction will 
produce sufficiently valuable military results to justify the political cost.89 
 
However, and in part pushed by the South Vietnamese government, it was less than six 
months before the question of crop destruction was back on the President’s desk.90  
Conflicting opinions about the tactical benefits and political costs still existed. 
Ambassador Nolting made the case for tactical benefits, arguing that even small-scale 
successful crop destruction would complicate VC and DRV logistical and operational 
planning.91 Secretary Rusk argued against, stating that crop destruction was premature 
because it would not yet yield military benefits.92 Michael Forrestal sent Kennedy a 
summary memo on 28 September reporting that Secretary McNamara, General Taylor 
and the field were all in favor of crop destruction; Averell Harriman and Roger Hilsman 
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still had doubts; that the program was premature; and that Murrow believed it would have 
significant political costs.93 On 2 October, the President granted approval for a crop 
destruction trial; given the division among his advisors, Kennedy may have felt that a 
trial to collect more information was the best way to proceed.94 As with the first defoliant 
operations, the purpose of the trial was to evaluate the military benefits and political 
costs. Kennedy requested a report on the results of the trials, and he personally followed 
up on the issue at least once.95 
 Even after the trials, the lack of definitive evidence for or against the tactical utility of 
both defoliation and chemical crop destruction was clear.96 Despite the lack of conclusive 
evidence, the operations continued. At least for the question of anti-plant agents, the burden 
of proof seems to have been put on arguments for lack of utility; since forces in the field 
continued to request the use of anti-plant agents, that burden was not met.97   
 
The Tactical Utility of Irritant Agents Although as mentioned above the technical 
effectiveness of irritant agents was already established, their tactical utility was less clear. 
Davis reports that in 1962 the head of the US Army Chemical-Biological-Radiological 
Agency, Brigadier General Fred J. Delmore, went to Vietnam and ‘made some suggestions 
as to the utility of the new riot control agent in the unconventional type of warfare then going 
on’.98 In June 1963, the Army conducted ‘a full scale troop test’ known as ‘Operation Water 
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97 Hersh quotes Lt. General William W. Dick, Jr. as testifying in 1965 that ‘we still have requirements 
from the commanders in Vietnam for defoliating agents….I can only assume that they find it has an 
ability to perform a job they want done’  (Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, 150). Similarly, as 
reported by SIPRI, ‘In December 1969 a US official stated that requests from field commanders for 
defoliation and crop destruction always exceeded US spray capacity’ (SIRPI, Rise of CB Weapons, 
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98 Davis, ‘Riot Control Weapons’, 4.  
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Bucket’ that demonstrated the effectiveness of CS in five tactical situations: ‘ambush of a 
foot patrol, ambush of a vehicle convoy, attack by a rifle company against a hostile assembly 
area, helicopter-borne attack on village, and enemy attack on a small outpost’.99 As the war 
developed, US soldiers discovered additional utilities such as clearing tunnels and 
underground shelters.100 
Combat use began in late 1964 and, as with anti-plant agents, there were diverse 
opinions on whether irritant agents were militarily effective.101 As with anti-plant agents, 
when tactical utility was questioned it was possible to fall back on the preferences of the 
forces in the field. When Westmoreland requested renewed authority to use irritant agents in 
September 1965, he stated that ‘tactical commanders at all levels of US and ARVNN forces 
have stated a desire to use RCA in tactical operations’.102 Similarly, Admiral Lemos argued 
in 1969 that soldiers chose to carry fewer high explosive weapons so that they could carry 
tear gas weapons.103  
However, unlike anti-plant agents, there was no sustained examination of tactical 
utility or political costs by top decision makers. As mentioned above, Kennedy requested and 
received reports on the effectiveness of anti-plant agents, and these evaluations continued 
into the Johnson administration, at least partially in response to criticism of their use.104 The 
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use of irritant agents was examined in various After Action Reports, as were other tactics 
and weapons, but this fed into the development of doctrine and munitions, not into any 
reconsideration of the use of these weapons.105  
The difference in the scrutiny given to anti-plant and irritant agents may be 
attributable, in part, to the fact that the US military had already accepted irritant agents. 
Thomas Hughes argues that ‘evolving technological systems’, which he defines as including 
both technical and social elements, ‘are time dependent’, and that over time, they become 
more difficult to shape.106 This suggests that to the extent that the use of irritant agents was 
institutionalised (e.g. standard issue under Military Assistance Programs), they would be 
more difficult to challenge.107 In the same way, the domestic use of both anti-plant and 
irritant agents meant that these agents were part of a technological system where the use of 
these agents were seen as safe and useful; it also meant there were vested interests in the 
continued use of these weapons. This made it more difficult to challenge their use in 
Vietnam.  
The challenges that did occur had little effect on policy in Vietnam. Once the Utter 
case in September 1965 made the humanitarian case, there appears to have been no 
reconsideration of their use. Moreover, as discussed further below, little was done to ensure 
that use lived up to the promised humanitarian role. 
 
Strategic effectiveness 
For the purposes of this article, ‘strategic effectiveness’ refers to the extent to which the use 
of particular weapons was seen as furthering or complicating broader US policy goals, 
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including the preservation of an independent South Vietnam, containment of the Soviet 
Union, and the prevention of nuclear war. Debates about the strategic effectiveness of 
particular weapons thus include debates about the international political costs likely to be 
associated with their use and the potential for undesired escalation. 
There was little focus in American policy discussions on the strategic effectiveness of 
anti-plant and irritant agents in Vietnam.108 International-political costs received some 
attention early on, but as the states that complained the most were Communist, US decision 
makers dismissed the complaints as propaganda. The influence of the germ war allegations 
made in the Korean War is interesting here.109 It definitely lead to an expectation that 
Communist states would make an issue of American use of anti-plant and irritant agents.110 
It may also have convinced US policy makers that such a campaign would not have much 
political effect.111 
Indeed, international-political costs were generally low. As discussed above, for a 
brief moment in March 1965, both friends and foes were critical of the United States’ use of 
irritant agents in Vietnam, but this blew over quickly. There were also efforts at the United 
Nations (UN) to oppose the US use of irritant and anti-plan agents. Between 1966 and 1972 
‘at least six General Assembly resolutions’ were adopted that ‘urged universal adherence to 
the Protocol or called for strict observance of its principles’.112 However, the US was able to 
blunt this opposition, as its allies generally avoided directly criticising the US either by 
accepting US efforts to weaken proposed resolutions or by abstaining on key votes. The 
strongest action came in December 1969, when 80 members of the UN General Assembly 
interpreted the Protocol as covering anti-plant and irritant agents by voting for Resolution 
2603 (XXIV); the US was joined by Australia and Portugal in voting against, while 36 states 
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abstained.113 Moore argues that the 36 abstainers ‘included most of the NATO members 
and many major or significant military powers…whose views would be particularly important 
in shaping a norm of customary international law’.114 The US dismissed the criticisms it 
received as ‘partisan’. The ‘conscious of mankind’ was not speaking with a unified voice, and 
this diminished its influence.115 
There was also little concern about the risk of escalation from anti-plant and irritant 
agents. President Eisenhower raised the possibility that the use of non-lethal chemical 
weapons would escalate to lethal chemical weapons in a 1960 meeting of the National 
Security Council.116 Congressional and other critics of the use of anti-plant and irritant 
agents in Vietnam were also concerned about the possibility of escalation.117 However, I 
have found no one within the Kennedy, Johnson or Nixon Administrations who argued 
against the use of anti-plant and irritant agents on these grounds. George Aldrich explains 
that ‘In 1965 and 1966 some of us in government thought that if the type of gas used in 
Vietnam could be limited to the type used commonly by democratic governments for the 
control of riots among their own people, this would provide a built-in restraint against the use 
of dangerous gases’.118 While officials did consider the potential for nuclear escalation in the 
Vietnam context, they evidently did not consider the use of anti-plant and irritant agents as a 
possible cause of escalation.119  
Because US decision makers saw both the international political costs of use and the 
possibility of escalation as low, strategic effectiveness largely reduced to the question of 
tactical effectiveness for these agents. 
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Peter D. Trooboff (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 175. Aldrich was 
Assistant Legal Advisor for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Department of State from July 1965-
October 1969. 
119 There was repeated analysis of likely responses from the Soviet Union and China to possible US 
courses of action. See, for example, Memo, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates 
to the Director, Subject: Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action, 3/13/68 , #9, TS-
186060, #9, ‘Vietnam 8, 2/68-3/68, Rostow Briefing Book on Military Situation in SVN and Paris 
Negotiations’, Country File, National Security File, Box 107, LBJ Library. 
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 In this section, I examined the key role that military utility—especially technical 
effectiveness and tactical utility—played in US decisions regarding the use of anti-plant and 
irritant agents. Once technical effectiveness was established, for both anti-plant and irritant 
agents there was a debate over tactical utility; tactical utility was then weighed against 
political costs. In both cases, the decision was for the use of the agents. In the next section, 
we will look more closely at norms and the generation of political costs. 
 
Norms 
I argued above that in the US decisions regarding the use of anti-plant and irritant agents, 
norms worked largely instrumentally, by raising the potential political costs associated with 
their use. As explored below, the possible costs associated with the use of these agents 
affected how decisions about use were made, led the US to pursue strategies to decrease 
the costs, and—at least in theory—led to limits on the ways that the agents could be used. 
 At least three types of norms generated these potential political costs: first, policy 
makers recognised the existence of a norm against chemical weapons; second, there was a 
concern with whether the use of these agents was legal; and third, policy makers displayed a 
concern with effects on non-combatants that presumably derived from the broader laws of 
war.120  
 
The norm against chemical weapons  
US policy makers clearly recognised the existence of a norm against chemical weapons that 
could generate both domestic and international costs. Because of this norm, they saw 
chemical weapons as having a separate status. For example, Robert Johnson suggested to 
Walt Rostow in April 1961 that the use of BW or CW ‘is obviously a subject that would 
warrant Presidential consideration because of the very important international political as 
well as possible moral considerations involved’.121 When a decision about anti-plant agents 
is required in November, Walt Rostow then told President Kennedy that his decision about 
the ‘use of a weed killer’ in Vietnam was ‘required because this is a kind of chemical 
warfare’.122 The taboo nature of chemical weapons is also suggested by Secretary Rusk 
                                            
120 Other scholars have addressed the interaction between specific weapon taboos and the broader 
laws of war. For example, Tannenwald argues that Nuclear Taboo ‘drew strength’ from the ‘growing 
intersection between military and humanitarian norms’. Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 366. 
121 Memo, Robert H. Johnson to Mr Rostow, Subject: Guerrilla Warfare Research Relating to South 
Vietnam, 8 Aug. 1961, Papers of President John F. Kennedy, National Security Files, Countries, 
‘Vietnam General, 9/61’, Box 194, Item 9, JFKL. 
122 FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. I, Doc. 269, Memo from Rostow to the President, 21 Nov. 1961. Note that 
decisions about the use of other weapons also received top policy maker involvement. A prime 
example here is napalm; see for example, Memo, Chester L. Cooper for Mr. Bundy, Subject: Gas and 
Napalm, 23 March 1965, #12, ‘Gas, Vol. I’, Country File, Vietnam, NSF, Box 194, LBJ Library.  
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when he distinguished between chemical and other means of crop destruction: ‘the use of 
strange chemical agents, to destroy crops, strikes at something basic implanted in human 
beings (even if the people do not—as many will—fear that the chemical agents are also 
directly harmful to people)’.123 
 In the case of irritant agents, the decision regarding use did not initially involve the 
President. After the Associated Press revealed the ‘use of nonlethal gas’ by South 
Vietnamese forces in March 1965, the New York Times ran a story with the headline, 
‘Decision On Gas Not President’s, White House Says’. 124 The President’s Press Secretary 
explained, ‘That’s not the sort of thing that comes up for that kind of approval. For many 
years, this kind of authority has been delegated to area commanders’.125 However, despite 
arguments that the use of these agents was routine, critics were astounded at the non-
involvement of the President. As Senator Mike Mansfield, Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, wrote to President Johnson, ‘It is beyond my comprehension how any 
American in an office of responsibility would not realize the vast significance, beyond 
immediate military considerations, of [the use of irritant agents], and therefore, seek the 
highest political authority before taking such a step’.126 The ‘vast significance’ identified by 
Mansfield stemmed from the norm surrounding chemical weapons. 
In their statements defending the use of irritant gases, US officials did not challenge 
the existence of a norm against chemical weapons—only its application to irritant agents. 
They distinguished between irritant agents and lethal chemical agents, and reaffirmed that 
the US ‘shared a general abhorrence of “inhuman” forms of warfare’.127 
These examples show that American policymakers recognised the existence of a norm 
against chemical weapons, even if they made an exception for anti-plant and irritant agents. 
                                            
123 FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. II, Doc. 270, Memo from the Secretary of State to the President, 23 Aug. 
1962. Note that in this memo Rusk draws on arguments against crop destruction made in a ‘Memo 
From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rice) to the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)’; see FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. II, Doc. 256, 2 Aug. 1962. 
124See, for example, the story as run in a Texas newspaper: Peter Arnett, ‘South Viet Nam Now 
Employing Nonlethal Gas’, Corsicana Daily Sun (Corsicana TX), 22 March 1965, 1, available through 
newspapers.com; Jack Raymond, ‘Decision On Gas Not President’s, White House Says’, New York 
Times, 24 March 1965. 
125 Jack Raymond, ‘Decision on Gas Not President’s, White House Says’, New York Times, 24 March 
1965. As implied by the Press Secretary’s statement, the lack of top policy maker involvement in the 
decision to use irritant weapons likely reflects the greater assimilation of irritant agents in the US 
military at the time. On assimilation, see J.P. Robinson, ‘Supply, Demand and Assimilation in 
Chemical-Warfare Armament’ in Military Technology, Armaments Dynamics and Disarmament: ABC 
Weapons, Military Use of Nuclear Energy and of Outer Space and Implications for International Law 
ed. H.G. Brauch (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 112-123. 
126 FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol II, Doc. 215, ‘Letter from Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson’, 24 
March 1965. 
127 Max Frankel, ‘US Reveals Use of Nonlethal Gas against Vietcong’, New York Times, 23 March 
1965. See also ‘Excerpts from Transcript of Rusk News Parley on Use of Gas in Vietnam’, New York 
Times 25 March 1965. 
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The existence of the norm meant that the use of these agents might have political costs—if 
others thought the norm did apply—and led American policymakers to adopt various 
strategies aimed at lowering the costs. 
One such strategy was to neutralise the language used. For example, U Alexis 
Johnson suggested to the Secretary of State, ‘We must also stay away from the term 
“chemical warfare” and any connection with the Chemical Corps, and rather talk about “weed 
killers”. Defense and the Chemical Corps entirely agree on this’.128  US officials also debated 
the extent to which US participation in these operations, and the operations overall, should 
be public. One issue here was whether the planes used in anti-plant operations should carry 
US markings.129 
Another strategy involved an attempt to ‘domesticate’ and ‘normalise’ the use of these 
agents. Public statements emphasised the widespread domestic use of anti-plant and irritant 
agents.130  The deliberateness of this strategy is clear in the response of the Commander in 
Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), to General Westmoreland’s 1964 plans for the combat 
use of CS gas. CINCPAC made note of Westmoreland’s discussion of the possibility of an 
adverse reaction to the use of the gas and recommended that 
If CS were first used in RVN [Republic of Vietnam] in controlling civil 
disturbances it might facilitate its introduction into counterinsurgency 
operations. GVN [the Government of Vietnam] could then adopt position that 
quote we use these harmless riot control weapons against our own people; 
it cannot be considered immoral for us to use them against our enemy 
unquote.131  
 
The US sought to enhance the legitimacy of anti-plant agents in similar ways, by 
emphasising the domestic use of these agents and that the South Vietnamese government 
                                            
128 See the first paragraph and footnote one of FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. I, Doc. 275, ‘Memorandum 
from the Secretary of State to the President’, 24 Nov. 1961. 
129 Crop destruction missions were flown under ‘Farmgate’ rules, with Vietnamese markings on the 
plane and a Vietnamese observer on board. See Lewy, America in Vietnam, 259; James R Clary, 
‘Ranch Hand: Herbicide Operations in SEA’, Project CHECO Report, ADA484753 (San Francisco: 
Department of the Air Force, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, 13 July 1971), 6, 11; Buckingham, 
Operation Ranch Hand, 24, 26-28, 104-5. In contrast, planes on defoliation missions carried US 
markings. See Buckingham, Operation Ranch Hand, 28. 
130 See, for example, ‘Transcript of the President’s News Conference on Foreign and Domestic 
Matters’, New York Times, 2 April 1965, when President Johnson stated ‘The type of gas that is a 
standard item in the South Vietnamese military forces—anti-riot item—can be purchased by an 
individual from open stocks in this country, just like you order something out of a Sears and Roebuck 
catalogue’. He went on to cite various uses that had been made of the gas in the US. 
131 ‘Use of CS to Control Riots in RVN’, 1 Sept. 1964, Folder 13, Box 08, George J. Veith Collection, 
The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University (accessed 15 October 2015). 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=3670813012. South Vietnamese troops did 
make use of tear gas in civil disturbances in November 1964, before the first use of these agents in 
combat. Hersh reports that the South Vietnamese were acting ‘on their own initiative’, but the 
September telegram from CINCPAC quoted above casts doubt on this. See Hersh, Chemical and 
Biological Warfare, 168. See also History Branch, Command History 1964, 96. 
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requested and was involved in the use of these agents. For example, there was a 
Vietnamese on board as the ‘aircraft commander’ for spray missions, although ‘he exercised 
no real authority’.132   
The fact that US policy makers saw the costs associated with the norm against 
chemical weapons as manipulable is significant. Tannenwald argues that one form of 
evidence for a ‘taboo explanation’ is that ‘the taboo could enter the decision-making process 
instrumentally in the form of a perceived ‘cost’, manifesting itself as an exogenously given 
constraint on decision-making’.133 As I have argued, the norm against chemical weapons did 
influence American policy-making in this way, except that policymakers did not see the costs 
as exogenous. Instead, US officials saw the costs as manipulable and therefore as only 
partially exogenous, and this lessened the impact of the norm. 
 
Legality 
Closely related to the existence of a norm against chemical weapons is question of whether 
the use of anti-plant and irritant agents was legal. Rusk addressed the legality of anti-plant 
agents in his memo for Kennedy in November 1961. He argued that ‘the use of defoliation 
does not violate any rule of international law concerning the conduct of chemical warfare and 
is an accepted tactic of war’, citing a precedent of British use in Malaya.134 William Bundy 
from the Department of Defense expanded on the legal argument when replying to a letter 
from Congressman Kastenmeier in 1963, arguing that under international law chemical 
warfare was limited to agents that inflict damage to the physical person of the enemy and 
thus did not include ‘weed killers’ used in both the US and Vietnam.135 
Before using irritant agents in combat, the Department of Defense asked the State 
Department whether such use was legal.136 While I have not been able to find a record of the 
State Department response to this query, the fact that the Department of Defense continued 
to explore and then to use irritant agents suggests that State confirmed their legality. In 
1965 an official stated that the use of these agents ‘was not contrary to international law and 
practice’, and Secretary Rusk emphasised that the Geneva Protocol did not prohibit their 
                                            
132 Buckingham, Operation Ranch Hand, 36.  
133 Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 51. 
134 FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 1, Doc. 275, 24 Nov. 1961. 
135 As reported by Buckingham, Operation Ranch Hand, 83. 
136 SIPRI, following Hersh, reports that early in 1964 the Department of Defense asked the 
Department of State to give a ruling on the legality of using ‘nonlethal’ gases in Vietnam. See SIPRI, 
Rise of CB Weapons, 185-6; Seymour M Hersh, ‘Poison Gas in Vietnam’, New York Review of Books 
(9 May 1968), available at: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1968/may/09/poison-gas-in-
vietnam/ (downloaded February 3, 2015). 
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use.137 The Johnson administration referenced both domestic use as well as international 
precedents in making its case for the legitimacy of both anti-plant and irritant agents. In 
regard to irritant agents, Rusk emphasised that these agents ‘have been used on many 
occasions, some in this country and on many occasions in other countries’; McNamara also 
cited several American domestic uses as well as use by the British in Cyprus, by West 
German border guards and in Canal Zone riots by Panamanian police.138   
Domestic and international critics continued to challenge the Administration’s case 
for legality, with little effect. Once the use of anti-plant agents began in 1962, and once 
authority to use irritant agents in Vietnam was confirmed in the fall of 1965, issues of legality 
received little attention from government officials until the Nixon Administration began to 
consider resubmitting the Geneva Protocol to the Senate.139  
 The ultimate influence of legality in the Vietnam case is unclear. Johnstone argues 
that because there were good arguments on both sides, ‘presumably… the legal question 
was never the determining factor in deciding the US position. Private conversations with 
international legal experts both within the Department of State and outside tend to confirm 
this presumption’.140 On the one hand, Johnstone’s argument, together with the emphasis 
on legality in official US statements, suggests that a more explicit ban on chemical weapons, 
one that clearly banned the use of anti-plant and irritant agents, might have prevented use, 
either directly or through the generation of increased political costs. On the other hand, it is 
not clear the United States would have become a party to such a ban as long as it thought 
that these agents had military utility.141 
 
Broader Laws of War 
The broader laws of war were also significant. In an article on the use of chemical agents in 
Vietnam, Seymour Hersh quotes a statement made after World War I by the General Board 
of the US Navy: ‘Gas warfare as practiced during the war, the Board said, violated two 
principles of combat which had been accepted by the civilized world for more than 100 
years—that unnecessary suffering should be avoided and innocent non-combatants should 
                                            
137 See Max Frankel, ‘US Reveals Use of Nonlethal Gas against Vietcong’, New York Times 23 March 
1965; ‘Excerpts from Transcript of Rusk News Parley on Use of Gas in Vietnam’, New York Times 25 
March 1965; and Finney, ‘Rusk Defends Use of Nonlethal Gas’, New York Times, 25 March 1965. 
138 See ‘Excerpts from Transcript of Rusk News Parley’ New York Times, 25 March 1965 and Jack 
Raymond, ‘Decision on Gas Not President’s, White House Says’, New York Times, 24 March 1965. 
139 When submitting the Geneva Protocol for consideration by the US Senate, Secretary of State 
Rogers argued, ‘It is the United States understanding of the Protocol that it does not prohibit the use 
of riot-control agents and chemical herbicides’. See Moore, ‘Ratification’, 423.  
140 Johnstone, ‘The United States Understanding of the Geneva Protocol’, DDRS, Gale, Doc. number 
CK3100518058, 5. 
141 The question of military utility and weapons bans will be developed in future work. 
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not be destroyed’.142 These broader norms clearly affected the US use of chemical agents in 
Vietnam.  
For example, the principal of discrimination was an issue with the use of anti-plant 
agents. Critics of chemical crop destruction argued that civilians were the main victims; 
Congressman Richard McCarthy declared in 1970 that ‘I find an anti-food campaign contrary 
to all principles of humanity. It has been shown time and time again that anti-food campaigns 
affect the soldiers of any enemy army last. The first to be affected are the old people and the 
children’.143 American officials also recognised and were concerned about the possible 
harming of non-combatants. As discussed above, when first considering the use of anti-plant 
agents, Kennedy sought assurance that crop destruction operations would take place only 
when it was possible to distinguish between enemy and civilian crops and when programs 
were in place to feed any civilians affected. After he approved crop destruction operations in 
principle, each operation required approval from Washington. Eventually, in 1964, the 
American Ambassador in Saigon and the COMUSMACV received authority to approve these 
operations.144 A complicated procedure was set up in South Vietnam to approve individual 
operations. This involved local Vietnamese chiefs at least in part to enable a distinction 
between civilian and enemy crops.145 There was also a reparations system to pay for 
accidental damage. Of course, to the extent that these actions reassured and/or avoided 
harm to civilians, they also lowered the political costs of the spray operations and helped to 
ensure that those costs did not outweigh the military gains.  
The broader laws of norms worked differently with irritant agents, justifying their use as 
a humane alternative when civilians were mixed with enemy combatants. For example, the 
JCS argued in 1965 that  
Appropriate and discriminate use of riot control munitions will lead to far fewer 
causalities and less loss of life than would the combat alternatives…This is 
especially pertinent and particularly important to those cases where the Viet 
Cong make use of women and children as screens against our troops.146 
                                            
142 Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, 211. An example of concern with harm to civilians in the 
war in general is a telegram from John McNaughton to Westmoreland in July 1965. See Cable, Office 
of Secretary of Defense to COMUSMACV, received in the White House on 9/9/65, #246a, ‘Vietnam 
Vol. XXXVIII, Memos (B) 8/1-12/65’, Country File, National Security File Box 21, LBJ Library; see also 
Cable. COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, Subject: Minimizing Non-Combatant Battle Casualties, received 
in the White House 10 Sept. 1965, #80a, ‘Vietnam Vol. XL, Cables 9/1-25/65’, Country File, National 
Security File, Box 22, LBJ Library. 
143 McCarthy, The Ultimate Folly, 87. 
144 With crop destruction, authority was delegated first for specific areas in Zone D and then later for 
other areas.  
145 The ability and/or willingness of the South Vietnamese government to make such distinctions can 
be questioned. Note also that US policymakers believed that South Vietnamese involvement gave the 
program increased legitimacy. 
146 Memo from Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense, Subject: 
Use of Riot Control Munitions in Vietnam (C)’, JCSM-685-65, 9/11/65, #3a, ‘Gas , Vol. II’, National 
Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 194 LBJ Library. According to Johnstone, ‘Westmoreland 
remarked in July 1965 that the only alternative to using tear gas to flush the enemy out of caves was 
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When the use of such agents became news in 1965, Secretary Rusk explained that ‘the 
anticipation is, of course, that these weapons be used only in those situations involving riot 
control or situations analogous to riot control’.147 However, in contrast to the system set up 
for anti-plant agents, there is little to suggest that the President or the Department of 
Defense attempted to restrict the use of irritant agents to humanitarian purposes. In 1967, 
ACDA Foster endorsed a recommendation by the Legal Adviser and the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Each Asian Affairs to ‘request the Secretary of State to impose some limitations 
on the use of riot-control agents in combat operations’.148 I have not been able to discover if 
the Defense Department ever received such a request, but if so, they do not appear to have 
acted on it. 
Indeed, as ‘Water Bucket’ makes clear, the military was interested in the use of irritant 
agents for a variety of purposes as early as 1964, and once Washington reaffirmed 
Westmoreland’s authority to use them in October 1965, there was little or no effort to monitor 
their use. It was not long before US forces used irritant agents in conjunction with 
conventional weapons to increase the lethality of attacks; as McCarthy argues, 
‘“Humanitarian” use [was] forgotten in the intensity of war’.149 
 US policymakers also asserted that both anti-plant and irritant agents were ‘safe’ and 
did not pose a threat to human health.150 During decision-making and then publicly, US 
                                            
to use napalm’. See Johnstone, ‘The United States Understanding of the Geneva Protocol’, DDRS, 
Gale, Doc. number CK3100518058, 5.  The non-lethal nature of irritant agents was also argued to 
have military utility: one could interrogate enemy soldiers if they were captured but not if they were 
killed.  
147 Excerpts from Transcript of Rusk News Parley’ New York Times, 25 March 1965.    
148 ACDA, ‘Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’, DDRS, Gale, Doc. number CK3100335632, 13-
14 citing Foster to Katzenbach [Under Secretary of State], Memo, 16 Oct. 1967 and Habib (State/EA) 
and Salans (State/L) to Katzenbach, Memo, 3 Oct. 1967. See also the memo from Katzenbach to 
Paul Nitze on 27 Dec. 1967 that suggests that Nitze work with Habib and Meeker of the State 
Department to develop rules of engagement that ‘address the use of tear gas to make other weapons 
more lethal’. See Air Force History Support Office, ‘Air Force History Report on Operation Tailwind’, 
16 July 1998, 41-42, available at: http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/afd-110112-009.pdf 
(downloaded 11 June 2014). A recommendation for limits was evidently incorporated into a State draft 
(14 Oct. 1968) of an interdepartmental NSAM on chemical and biological weapons; see ACDA, ‘Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency’, DDRS, Gale, Doc. number CK3100335632, 16. Aldrich reports 
that although the State Department failed in its attempt to limit the use of irritant agents to 
humanitarian purposes, it was successful in prohibiting the use of DM, an irritant agent that was more 
lethal than CN or CS. See Aldrich, ‘Comments’, 175. 
149 McCarthy, The Ultimate Folly, 50; see also Ellison, Chemical Warfare, 73; Bunn, ‘Banning Poison 
Gas’, 256-257. 
150 Ecological effects were also an issue. Policy makers recognized this as a possible political cost as 
early as 1962, when Rachel Carson’s The Silent Spring was published. Individual scientists and 
scientific associations continued to emphasise possible ecological effects and got the issue on to the 
government agenda. As a result, various studies were commissioned to evaluate ecological effects. 
But the results of these studies were either that there would be no long-term ecological damage or 
that it was not yet possible to determine the ecological effects, in part because of the difficult of 
conducting the necessary research in a war zone. See Zierler, Invention of Ecocide. For more on the 
role of scientists, see Sarah Bridger, Scientists at War: The Ethics of Cold War Research (Cambridge, 
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policymakers argued that the innocuous effect of both anti-plant and irritant agents was clear 
from the widespread domestic use of these agents. However, this concern with safety was 
largely superficial. Policy makers did not undertake any serious effort to examine whether 
the use of these agents domestically and in Vietnam was really equivalent in terms of the 
likely effects.151  
In retrospect, these assertions of safety seem cynical if not downright duplicitous. US 
forces used irritant agents to force people from tunnels or shelters in Vietnam, and it was 
known that they were more likely to be lethal in such closed conditions.  The domestic use of 
anti-plant agents also differed significantly from their use in Vietnam, in terms of the quantity 
of agent sprayed, the quantity of land sprayed, and the intended effects, and by July 1969, 
the US had sprayed more than ten percent of South Vietnam with herbicides.152 However, 
this was not necessarily duplicitous. Recent work arguing for the importance of context in 
interpreting the legality of the use of particular weapons suggests that at the time of the 
Vietnam War the accepted approach to the legality of weapons was to think in dichotomous 
terms (legal or illegal, safe or unsafe), instead of thinking in terms of gradations or context.153 
 Moreover, when a study was published that suggested that Agent Orange (2,4,5-T) 
caused malformed babies and stillbirths in mice when administered in relatively high doses, 
policy did change.154 In November 1969, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard restricted the 
use of Agent Orange in Vietnam to areas remote from populations (the use of other anti-
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151 Wil D. Verwey, Riot Control and Herbicides in War (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1977), 13-15, 48-49. 
152 Johnstone, ‘The United States Understanding of the Geneva Protocol’, DDRS, Gale, Doc. number 
CK3100518058, 7. The formulation of Agent Orange also differed from its domestic formula. See 
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Toxicology, Environmental Fate, and Human Risk of Herbicide Orange and its Associated Dioxin’, 
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figures on the use of anti-plant agents in Vietnam; see also Young et al., ‘The Toxicology, 
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154 The key report was Bionetics Research Laboratories, Evaluation of Carcinogenic, Teratogenic and 
Mutagenic Activities of Selected Pesticides and Industrial Chemicals (1968). The story of who knew 
what, and when, about the health effects of Agent Orange is controversial, with some authors 
suggesting that US officials deliberately covered-up the Bionetics study. See Aaron Wildavsky with 
Brendon Swedlow, ‘Dioxin, Agent Orange and Times Beach’ in But is it True? A Citizen’s Guide to 
Environmental Health and Safety Issues (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1997), 81-125; see also Zierler,  
Invention of Ecocide, esp. 122-124; Lewy, America in Vietnam, 263; Martini, Agent Orange, 100, 240-
241; Buckingham, Operation Ranch Hand, 163-164. 
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plant agents continued as normal).155 Then in April 1970, the Department of Defense 
suspended the use of Agent Orange completely, despite protests from the military, when 
three Federal agencies decided to impose new limits on its use in the United States.156 By 
Rusk’s own definition, if Agent Orange was harmful to humans its use should be classed as 
chemical warfare and the United States claimed to abide by the norm against it; such harm 
also violated wider laws of war against unnecessary suffering, proportionality, and 
discrimination.157  
 The influence of ‘safety’ in the Vietnam case is suggestive. While the presumption in 
US  policy-making on anti-plants agents was that they were safe, the fact that the norm 
against chemical weapons and the broader laws of war were understood to establish a 
principle that chemicals should not be used to kill humans and especially non-combatants in 
war provided a base on which to argue against the use of these agents.158 However, the 
case for the use of anti-plant agents rested perhaps to a unique degree on the argument that 
they did not harm humans, for both Kennedy’s initial decision to authorise use and the public 
case for use rested upon their safety. More typically, for irritant agents, the claim was that 
they were ‘more humane’ than the alternatives. This suggests that there is more work to do 
on the interaction between the norm against chemical weapons, the broader laws of war, 
and the material characteristics of weapons. 
In the same way, the domestic use of both anti-plant and irritant agents meant that 
these agents were part of a technological system where the use of these agents were seen 
as safe and useful; it also meant there were vested interests in the continued use of these 
weapons. This made it more difficult to challenge their use in Vietnam. Moreover, as we 
have seen, it was not until the use of Agent Orange was limited domestically that it was 
banned in Vietnam. 
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158 See Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 52 for a discussion of the ‘burden of proof’ as a measure of 
normative effects. 
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Conclusion 
This article has investigated the role that military utility and normative factors played in US 
decisions regarding the use of anti-plant and irritant agents in the Vietnam War. I have 
shown that US policy makers used a consequentialist logic in their decisions, weighing the 
costs of use against the benefits. There was little evidence of the use of an appropriateness 
logic; there is no example of a US policy maker who argued that the US should not use 
these weapons because any chemical weapon was somehow antithetical to the US’s self-
conception. Instead, US decision makers conveniently designated anti-plant and irritant 
agents as falling outside the category of prohibited chemical weapons.  
In the calculation of costs versus benefits, US policymakers treated military utility as 
the most important issue. They generally argued that if these weapons had military utility, 
then they should be used. In this sense, considerations of military utility was determinative. 
This is not to say that normative factors had no influence. Normative factors featured largely 
instrumentally, as a possible generator of political costs that were included in the 
consequentialist logic. Normative factors thus made the use of these weapons more difficult, 
with potential political costs ‘raising the bar’ that had to be met in order for them to be used. 
They also led policy makers to devise strategies to lessen potential political costs, including 
oversight and restrictions on the use of anti-plant agents. Norms surrounding chemical 
weapons also influenced the process of decision-making, and in particular, they raised the 
issue of weapons use from a purely military decision to one that involved top policy makers, 
including the President.  However, pressure on US decision makers to use any tool that 
might contribute to victory in South Vietnam meant that normative factors were not decisive. 
This pressure seems to have led to a presumption of military utility; those who argued 
against the use of weapon had to meet an increased burden of proof. 
I demonstrated that three types of military utility received attention—technical, tactical, 
and strategic. US policy makers treated technical utility as an absolute—as something a 
weapon did or did not have--at least within a specific context. The case study also shows 
that military utility is difficult to assess and that there is room to contest it. In particular, it 
demonstrates that tactical effectiveness was debated and socially negotiated. Within those 
negotiations, the military played a special role as the presumptive authority on military utility. 
The role of the military as the arbiter of military utility, together with the fact of domestic use 
and the need to bring all possible advantages to bear in Vietnam, made it more difficult to 
oppose the use of these agents once their technical utility was established. With anti-plant 
agents, publication of a finding that Agent Orange was harmful to human health was 
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necessary before its use was restricted, while the US military used irritant agents until the 
end of the war.  
This case is also suggestive of other factors that influenced US policy. One is the 
possible impact of organisational interests. The available documents do not allow a clear 
determination of who first suggested the use of irritant agents in Vietnam or how irritant 
agents came to be included in Military Assistance Programs.159 There is thus more work to 
do on the role of various individuals and institutions involved in the American CBW program 
and the role they played in US decisions to use anti-plant and irritant agents in Vietnam.  
The Vietnam War is generally seen as a turning point in the role of the media in war.160 
While space constraints prevented me from developing this, it is clear from the documentary 
record that American policy makers were sensitive to media coverage of the use of anti-plant 
and irritant agents. Future research might explore the extent to which media coverage 
served as a channel through which normative concerns influence policymaking.161  
Similarly, the role of popular protest deserves more attention than I was able to give it 
here. While I have suggested above that the finding that Agent Orange was harmful to 
human health was a key factor in the decision to restrict the use of anti-plant agents in 
Vietnam, that decision took place within a broader context. That broader context included the 
Tet Offensive and the increasing hollow nature of assurances that the US could win the war, 
Vietnamisation of the war effort, and increased public protests against the war.162 While the 
continued use of irritant agents (as well as napalm, which was the most controversial) 
suggests that this broader context was not directly responsible for the restrictions on the use 
of Agent Orange and other herbicides, it is likely that it facilitated those restrictions. 
There is also more work to do on the role of norms. It is possible that the modest 
impact of norms in decisions about the use of anti-plant and irritant agents in Vietnam is due 
to the fact that the war came in an early part of the ‘life cycle’ of the norm against chemical 
weapons. If this is the case, we would expect to see more appropriateness-type reasoning 
as the norm develops.163  Realists would expect that military pressures would continue to 
constrain policy makers to give greater consideration to military utility than political costs, 
even in the face of a developed norm against weapons use.   
                                            
159 Jacobsen states that William Godel of ARPA was ‘the architect of…the Agent Orange defoliation 
campaign’. Jacobsen, The Pentagon’s Brain, 180, see also 126-128. 
160 See, for example, William M Hammond, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968 
(Washington DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1990). While this is not a focus of my research, 
it is clear that early on American decision makers thought that public opinion about the war was 
something that they could manipulate; my sense is that this belief was eroded over time. 
161 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point. 
162 Zierler argues that the Nixon administration’s strategy of détente was an important part of the 
context as well. See Zierler, Invention of Ecocide, 138ff. 
163 See Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics’. 
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A related question concerns the role of the Vietnam War in the further development of 
international norms, including norms against chemical and biological weapons as well as 
environmental modification techniques.164 For example, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee held the Geneva Protocol hostage to a change in US policy on anti-plant and 
irritant agents, refusing to ratify the treaty unless the Nixon and then the Ford Administration 
made such changes. The agreement eventually reached with the Ford Administration 
produced Executive Order 11850, ‘Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical 
Herbicides and Riot Control Agents’.165 
The analysis here suggests that other normative factors, including legal prohibitions 
and the broader laws of war, also influence state decisions regarding the use of particular 
weapons. To the extent that international treaties formalised normative concerns, they were 
an explicit constraint on US policy; they necessitated a judgement about legality. This meant 
that US policy makers had to consider and make an explicit decision about use, and so 
prevented use following inevitably from the availability of these agents.166  While this 
constraint is valuable in providing an opportunity to scrutinise the necessity of use, some 
analysts at the time suggested that since legal arguments could be made both for and 
against the legality of these agents, legality did not provide a strong constraint.167 And again, 
both social and material factors are important: With the broader laws of war that focus on 
harm to non-combatants, the material characteristics of weapons are key, as these help to 
determine a weapon’s potential for discriminate use as well as its lethality.168 
There is also more work to be done on norms and utility in the Vietnam War. In future 
work I will extend this analysis to examine US policy-making on the use of biological, 
nuclear, and lethal chemical weapons in Vietnam. The non-use of these weapons and the 
                                            
164 I thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to make this point. For an analysis of the 
Vietnam War and its impact on thinking regarding the relationship between war and the environment, 
see Zierler, Invention of Ecocide. Jacobsen suggests there were other spin-offs; that the Vietnam War 
and the protests against it led to an acceleration of research into non-lethal weapons. See Jacobsen, 
Pentagon’s Brain, 217-221; see also Crowley, Chemical Control. 
165 The text of the executive order is available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/11850.html (accessed 25 March 2016). Note that this Order has 
not been the last word on the large-scale use of herbicides or the use of irritant agents in war. See, for 
example, Martin Jelsma, ‘Vicious Circle: The Chemical and Biological “War on Drugs’, Transnational 
Institute (March 2001), available at: https://www.tni.org/files/download/viciouscircle-e.pdf; William 
Neuman, ‘Defying US, Colombia Halts Aerial Spraying of Crops Used to Make Cocaine’, New York 
Times, 14 May 2015; on arguments for the use of irritant agents by US forces in war since Vietnam, 
see Crowley, Chemical Control. 
166 I thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this role of legal norms. 
167 The work on the targeting of civilians in war also casts doubt on the constraining power of 
international law in time of war. See Valentino et al., ‘Covenants without the Sword’; Downes, 
Targeting Civilians; see also Krasner, Sovereignty, for a more general dismissal of the power of 
international principles to constrain states. 
168 Of course, social construction can still play a role in determining what level of harm to civilians is 
acceptable or indeed in the construction of the categories of combatant and non-combatant. 
39 
 
recognition of a norm against their use make this an important comparison for the work 
undertaken here.169  
  Overall, this case study demonstrates that, although both norms and military utility 
influenced US decisions about chemical use and non-use in Vietnam, those decisions were 
based largely -- as structural realists expect – by a concern with military effectiveness. 
                                            
169 I will also examine the non-use of nuclear weapons. 
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